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Kees van Kersbergen en Bertjan Verbeek 
The future of national social policies in the context
of European integration'
1 lnti-nrinr>tinn lation, where ageing is a combined effect of an in-i lniroaucuon « rr  * i  ^ , *i*creased life expectancy and a decreasing fertility
The research question guiding this article is wheth- rate. Secondly, the traditional family towards which 
er and to what extent transnational pressures that so many social policies were targeted no longer ex-
appear common to all national welfare states pro­
duce similar outcomes in terms of their social poli­
cies. Our leading hypothesis is that transnational o f  stable employment patterns and trajectories that seem
ists as the number of divorced, single-person and 
single-parent households spirals. Thirdly, the kind
pressures do narrow national political options to a 
considerable extent, but do not entirely exhaust the
y
room for national policy-makers to choose from a the post-industrialization of labour markets (de-in-
to have belonged to a growing, industrial economy 
are challenged. Slackening economic growth and
set of (limited) options. This is particularly the case 
for social policy. Moreover, even if similar policies 
are pursued, the policy outcomes are not necessarily 
identical across national contexts. In addition, under
dustrialization, the growth of the service economy, 
new technologies and flexibilization, etc.) have 
generally decreased job security and the continuity 
of employment and have caused a rise in irregular
certain conditions transnational constraints effec- and atypical employment. Fourthly, changing rela-
tively emerge as new options. What is commonly 
understood as transnational constraints on sove-
tions between men and women with respect to 
the division of labour within and outside the family
reignty and autonomy may under certain condi- (paid work and unpaid care) as well as the increasing
tions and to a certain extent in reality provide new differentiation of the life cycle and of careers have
opportunities that, in fact, augment the national strongly challenged the gendered assumptions of
room for policy-making. Finally, the extent to many welfare state arrangements. Fifthly, political!)
which common pressures result in common out- recognized systems of interest intermediation have histor-
comes depends on a range of intervening variables ically accorded a firm social and economic basis to
that vary from country to country, such as the the welfare state, but have now considerably eroded,
openness of the national economy, the type ofpo- sometimes as a result of deliberate politics, but
Iitical system, the type of social and economic generally as a result of the weakened position of the
system, the extent to which changes in one policy organized labour movement. Sixthly, the political
areas set incentives for change in adjacent policy ar- coalitions that once supported the welfare state have
eas, and on the precise nature of the emerging Eu- either weakened or have broken down entirely,
ropean social policy regime itself. Moreover, broad popular support for the welfare
Transnational factors are not alone in putting state may very well be on the verge of collapsing as
pressure on European welfare states. They are con­
fronted with a pennanent necessity to adjust their 
institutional arrangements to changing demograph­
ic, social and economic circumstances. The condi-
political actors who defend the legacy of the welfare 
state increasingly fail to do so and those who opt for 
rolling back the welfare state considerably have no 
answer to new risks and needs that partly result from
. tions under which the post-war welfare state___ the very politics of retrenchment. In this article we 
emerged as well as the assumptions upon which so­
cial policies were formulated and implemented no _________________________________________
longer seem to obtain. In this sense, there exist at ~  Tr Tr t , -, f .. . r T •
, . . . . . .  Dr. K. van Kersbergen en dr. B. V erbeek zijn als Umver-
least six common pressures m addition to transna- sifair Docent verbonden aan de Vakgroep Polidcologie en
tional forces. Firsdy, the relatively stable balance Bestuurskunde van de Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam, De
between generations is challenged by an ageing popu- Boelelaan 1081c, ioSi HV Amsterdam
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concentrate on analysing the pressures put 011 na- tional systems; 3) competition between national 
tional governments1 social policies by the related systems for mobile production factors, A suprana- 
developments of globalisation of the economy and tional, European level of social policy exists, but has
European integration.
2 Different fields, opposite views
not replaced the national welfare state and is restrict­
ed in tenus of authoritative capacities. However, 
national social policy is affected by integration: ‘A 
supranational social policy regime limited to mar-
Leading theories from the fields of international po~ ket-making, forces national social policy to devote 
litical economy, international relations and Europe- significant political resources to the opening of na­
an integration argue that transnational processes like tional borders (...). With market integration laying 
globalization and European integration are funda- national welfare states open to unprecedented com- 
mentally limiting the autonomy and even the sove- petitive pressures, nationally confined economic 
reignty of national states and of national policy- and social policies become dependent on the vol- 
making. The literature on globalization stresses that untary cooperation of mobile production factors, 
national states (and therefore national welfare states) forcing governments to rely more and more on the
have lost to a large extent their autonomy and effi­
cacy in policy-making. An example is the contem­
porary functionalist argument, as summarized by 
Hout (1996: p. 166): ‘In every political system, a 
number of functions have to be performed. Under 
the influence of (for instance, technological, orga­
nizational, or financial) developments external to the 
political system, the national political authorities 
will experience more difficulty in the transmission 
of their decisions into an effective “allocation of val»
provision of incentives and inducements for the lat­
ter. In the process national social policy regimes and 
the national social compacts that sustain them are 
bound to be fundamentally transformed’ (Streeck, 
in Marks etal. 1996: p. 88).
Starting from a moderate version of the neo­
functionalist view of European integration and em­
phasizing the possibility if not likeliness of spillovers, 
Leibfried and Pierson (1995: p. 45) argue that ‘the 
movement toward market integration will be ac-
ues”. As a result of this loss of policy-making cap a- companied by the gradual erosion of the autonomy
bility, some of the government’s functions will be and sovereignty of national welfare states; national
eroded and assumed by actors that operate on a regimes will become more and more enmeshed in a
transnational or an international level. Consequent- complex, multitiered web of social policy1.
ly, the nation-state as a political organization loses 
much of its importance5.
The literature on European integration empha­
sizes that the European Union (EU) has decreased 
the autonomy of national governments and in cer­
tain domains the sovereignty of the member states.
Moreover, the flexibility in policy implementation 
and the control over national constituencies has di­
minished (V. Schmidt 1996). The European wel­
fare state regimes are now largely embedded in the 
internal market and the two-tier system of Europe­
an social policy-making. In this context, the room 
for national social policy-making is restricted and 
shrinking with every new stage of integration. Ac­
cording to Streeck (in Marks et al. 1996: p. 83- 88), 
three kinds of constraints are relevant for national 
social policy-making: 1 ) obligations in international 
law to enable cross-border mobility of labour; 2) 
growing interdependence with actors in other na- patterns of variation in social policy-making, policy
I11 general, the consequence of these develop­
ments is that different welfare state regimes are like­
ly to follow very similar paths of adjustment and 
change according to the pressures that they face and 
in spite of the dissimilarity in their institutional lay­
out and political systems. Transnational pressures 
are hypothesized to 4overdetermine’ institutional 
legacies, transform the options available for national 
policy-making and redirect choices according to 
the logic of adaptation common to all systems.
Mainstream welfare state research has long con­
centrated 011 the economic, social and political 
causes and consequences of cross-national welfare 
state variation. A leading hypothesis of contempo­
rary comparative research is that the established in­
stitutions, relations of power among interests that 
these institutions generate, and the political and ad­
ministrative mechanisms of welfare states govern
22 s i  1 9 9 7 / 1
implementation and policy outcomes to a consider­
able extent. This effect of the welfare state was 
found to be relevant in many areas, rançinç from
4  V /  C *
the quality of social security arrangements and the 
level of benefits to the availability of social services 
and other provisions, from patterns of urban pover­
ty to changes in the general distribution of income, 
and from the structuring of post-industrial employ­
ment careers to the transformation of the class struc­
ture and the formation of new classes. Distinct wel­
fare state regimes have pursued different policies 
and have performed differently in ternis of out­
comes, whether these are measured in terms ol em­
ployment, equality, poverty, social protection or 
otherwise.
The institutional composition of a welfare state 
regime — understood as a more or less coherent set 
of relatively fixed rules and regulations of social pol­
icy-making and social policy implementation -  is 
said to constrain the options available to respond to
3 Common pressures and political con­
sequences
3 .1 . Globalization of the economy and its political conse­
quences — What is globalization? It has become al­
most a commonplace to say that states have always 
been affected by the whims of the international 
economy. Traditionally, however, states have been 
able to hold a relatively firm grip 011 the impact of 
the international economy on their societies. To 
that purpose states had at their disposal various poli­
cy instruments, such as interest rates policies, the 
manipulation of exchange rates and the imposition 
of tariffs and quotas at their borders. What has to be 
stressed here is that the welfare state, too, can be 
considered as an important means by which nation­
states have been able to compensate the social costs 
of adjusting to the constraints of the world market.
The development of the international economy 
over the last ten to fifteen years or so, currently con-
contemporary challenges. Institutions are both ena- ceptualized as globalization, is a subject of much
bling and impeding. They permit certain responses 
and tend to inhibit others. In spite of common pres­
sures, then, different welfare state regimes are likely 
to follow7 distinct paths of adjustment and change 
according to the constraints of their institutional 
layout. There is a "continued dominance of national 
institutional traditions. This comes out in two im­
portant respects. Firstly, while die postwar Western 
welfare states addressed fairly similar objectives, they 
differed both in terms of ambition and in terms how 
they did it. Secondly, as these same welfare states to­
day seek to adapt, they do so very differendy. A ma­
jor reason has to do with institutional legacies, in­
debate, not in the least because of its allegedly dra­
matic impact on the nature of both international 
and domestic politics. However, there is much 
confusion about the nature and consequences of 
globalization (see for an overview: Jones 1995; 
Waters 1995; Armingeon 1996). As to its nature, 
some authors confine the process to the revolution 
in communication technology that has produced 
the ‘global village’. Others restrict the phenomenon 
to changes in the production structure of the world 
economy. Finally, there are those who argue that a 
large part of the discussion around globalization is 
mere rhetoric, because the increased interaction on
herited system characteristics, and the vested inter- a global level is in itself an insignificant phenome
ests that these cultivate1 (Esping-Andersen 199Ó: p. 
6).
In sum, different fields of political research yield 
opposite conclusions and hypotheses on the impact 
of transnational pressures on national welfare states. 
Below we try to identify common pressures, the 
intervening variables that may determine the form 
and extent of openness to such pressures, the com­
mon dilemmas of welfare states and the intervening 
variables that are likely to produce different re­
sponses to common pressures and the variation in 
outcomes.
non.
We prefer to start from the assumption that 
globalization may have various social, political, cul­
tural as well as economic components, but that the 
core conceptualization of the phenomenon must 
address the notions that the constraints of geography 
(tern tory) are becoming less and less powerful and that peo­
ple are increasingly becoming aware of this (see Waters 
1995- p* 3; see also Storper 1995: 279- 84). We fur­
thermore note, however, that in many analyses it 
remains unclear how one should interpret the con­
sequences of globalization. Increased interaction, 
e.g., in the fonn of trade, tourism, or money flows,
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can no doubt be observed and considered imp or- tional financial markets. On the one hand, states 
tant, but the crucial issue is that one has to specify open up to world markets and thus refrain from 
why these developments are so important and meddling too much in the inflow and outflow of 
whom they affect. capital. On the other hand, technological innova- 
In order to specify the political consequences of tions have made it possible to transfer instantly large 
economic globalization in general terms, it is useful sums of money from one place to another. By con­
to identify three separate trends in the world econo- sequence, transnational corporations find it easier to 
my, the first two relating to changes in production shift production sites according to the law of coin- 
technology, the third to the structure of interna- punitive advantages, and thus survive in the global 
tional finance (see Frieden 19 9 1; Stopford and competition for market shares. It is here that the es- 
Strange 19 9 1; Strange 1986, 1992; Camilleri and sence of globalization, the decreasing importance of 
Falk 1992; Waters .1995; Jones 1995; Haggard 1995; territory, becomes clear: money can travel easily
see also Verbeek 1993). and elements of the production process can be rek>
I . Changing product cycle. Changes in technology cated relatively easily,
have allowed producers to supply the market with What is the impact of economic globalization on
new goods and to produce old goods using new politics and the welfare state? Firstly, we observe
processes. Moreover, the development of the that national welfare states are becoming increasing-
means of transportation has made it easier for pro- ly dependent on world market shares (or the generation
ducers to supply distant markets. By consequence, of wealth and welfare. Nation-states in general and
the life cycle of a product has been significantly democratic welfare states in particular have politi-
shortened. Producers who have invested heavily in cally committed themselves to the delivery of a cer~
the development of new goods and services and in tain level of welfare for their citizens. The produc-
the standardization of their production are con­
fronted with competitors who emulate production 
techniques more rapidly than in the past, As a result 
and in order to outwit competition they now are
tion of welfare, however, is increasingly difficult to 
obtain nationally and the welfare state becomes 
more dependent on national producers who per­
form well on the world market. Nation-states are
compelled to invest in the development of new thus captured in a fundamental dilemma. Given the
products at a much earlier point of time than in the unpredictable nature of international competition
past. they may end up with a loss of welfare because pro-
2 . Costs of research and development. The costs of ducers decide to shift production sites (or their prof-
developing and introducing new goods have dra- its) to different regions. Nation states may therefore
matically risen over the past ten years. It is no coin prefer short term protectionism in order to deliver
cidence that this period witnessed an increase in the welfare as quickly as possible, but only at the risk of 
number of alliances between producers, such as suffering a dramatic loss of welfare in the loiig run, 
joint ventures, as a means to share technologies and once national producers have adapted to the laws of 
reduce development costs. The consequence of the international competition, 
need to develop new products continuously for 
competitive reasons is an increased need to sell 
more goods and services. 'This has forced a large 
number of producers to sell their products on the 
world market rather than on their national markets,
Less and less do they rely on national governments 
that protect national markets. Instead, they prefer 
that national governments open up their markets to 
the world economy and thus increase their 
producers* potential market share.
3 . Liberalization ofinteniationaljhtancial markets. A 
parallel development is the opening up of interna-
Secondly, we identify changing pomr relationships 
between state and business, both at the national and the 
international level. Nationally, governments tend 
to become more responsive to the demands of pro­
ducers, both those seeking protectionism and chose 
asking for adjustment to the global market. Interna­
tionally, states will he in a weaker position when 
negotiating with those transnational firms that can 
easily shift production elsewhere.
Thirdly, we note increasing constraints on the num­
ber of policy instruments available to states to uphold the 
existing framework of wellàre arrangements. (îlo~
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halization has alreadv seriously undermined the ca- equipped. New social conflicts are then likely to oc-
pacitv of the state to steer the national economy by 
using the macroeconomic instruments of the Key­
nesian welfare state (Martin 1994). The national 
room to manoeuvre in the realm of macroeconom- have to transform macroeconomic strategies and
cur before the potential fin its of adjustment to the 
global market arrive. At the same time, govern­
ments, faced with increased global integration, may
ie policy is likely to decline further when the inte­
gration of global finance continues to increase. A 
high degree of global financial integration leads to 
the abandonment of the instrument of interest rate 
manipulation in favour of the instrument of ex­
change rate manipulation (Frieden 1991). More­
over, there is an increasing pressure on the financial 
means (taxes, contributions) to uphold national 
welfare state arrangements.
Fourthly, we observe changing patterns of conflicting 
interests. The three developments previously men­
tioned tend to cause the nature of societal conflicts 
to change. Governments are confronted with de­
mands for protection and integration into the world 
market at the same time. Moreover, the decreased
room for policy manoeuvre affects various domestic 
groups differently. For instance, the shift from inter­
est rate manipulation to exchange rate manipulation 
as a major macroeconomic policy tool has diverse 
effects on different economic sectors. In general,
social policies, thus favouring the interests of certain 
groups over others. In the short and middle run, 
therefore, governments may run into problems of 
legitimation as they put their authority at risk (Ver­
beek 1995).
Here we arrive at an obvious yet often over­
looked contradiction between the logic of eco­
nomics and the logic of politics. Although integra­
tion into the global market economically seems to 
make sense in the long run, it is the short run which 
dominates the perspective of politics. Political par­
ties and politicians are interested in rational policies 
and policy innovations, but only to the extent that 
these guarantee their political survival within the 
political-institutional context in which they have to 
operate (cf. Haggard and Kaufman 1992). This ten­
sion between economics and politics is most pro­
nounced in advanced democratic welfare states.
3.2 Globalization and its political consequences con-
financial institutions and multinational corporations tested — The above view of globalization is contest- 
may benefit, because they have a diversified ed. As a matter of fact, after a period in which ‘the
production, while enterprises concentrating on a 
limited number of products in a single sector (e.g.,
age of globalization has been prophecied by scholars 
and policymakers alike, a countermovement has set
construction, textiles) are likely to experience in declaring globalization a myth, or at best an 
disadvantages (Frieden 1991). Such shifting distrib- ideology best captured as ‘globaloney\ Klaus Ar- 
utional effects have their impact 011 the political mingeon (1996) has recently argued that it is far
pressure exercized by various groups aifected.
Globalization of the economy engenders a con­
text in which governments are facing new pressures 
from various groups in society. Basically, they have
from clear that globalization erodes the nation­
state’s capacity to act and that the argument has not 
been rigorously tested in an empirically meaningful 
manner On a theoretical level, he identifies five
a choice between protecting non-competitive in- blind spots in the globalization thesis: 1) the extent
dustries and facilitating their adjustment to the of globalization is exaggerated; 2) the pressures from
world market. Both strategies may in the short run globalization are exaggerated; 3) Western states
threaten their political survival. Protecting non- have since long been interdependent and both poli-
competitive industries and sectors may prove coun­
terproductive to the extent that those industries are 
dependent on the world market and their protec­
tion will be challenged by other producers. Produc-
tics and policies have been affected by this interde­
pendence; 4) nation-states are no simple victims but 
have several options to respond to the challenges of 
globalization; 5) institutional legacies and inertia as
ing wealth may thus not be guaranteed. Adjusting well as the relations of power within a nation affect
to world markets means becoming competitive and the manner in which pressures are transmitted. His
adopting measures that cause social problems for empirical analysis leads to the general conclusion
which national social policy arrangements are ill- that ‘the capability of national political systems to
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manipulate the parameters of public income and 
spending and to maintain diversity persists' (Annin- 
geon 1996: p. 27). However, although this argu­
ment is less well developed in Anningeon’s paper, 
‘national political actors autonomously can contin­
ue to do things differently, but today it makes less 
difference than in the past’ (Anningeon 1996: p. 
28). The reason is that the capacity of national poli­
cies to produce the intended results is diminished by 
the decreasing control that national governments 
have over supranational policies.
Several remarks are in order in this context. First 
of all, it is important not to identify globalization 
with interdependence. It can indeed be argued that 
the level of trade relations between nation-states 
and of foreign direct investment today has not yet 
reached the same levels as in 1914 (cf. Waltz 1979). 
Moreover, it is as important not to jump to conclu­
sions as soon as an enormous rise in international 
communication (travel, internet, phonecalls, etc.) is 
observed, a mistake already made bv several scholars
0  #
in the 1950s (e.g., Deutsch 1953). The relevant 
question is whether such empirical phenomena 
change the mutual dependency relationships 
between actors on a global, national as well as sub- 
national level, thus avoiding the identification of 
interconnectedness with interdependence (cf. 
Keohane and Nye 1977). The relevant question 
therefore is to what extent globalization signifies 
a change in mutual dependency relations. Let us 
illustrate this point with the relationships between 
governments and global business.
It is regularly claimed that globalization does not 
exist because the data do not bear out that national 
producers are presently predominantly producing 
for a global market (e.g., Ruigrok and Van Tulder
I995)- This is missing the point twice: it is not im­
portant whether the largest share of producers’ ex­
ports is produced for the global market, rather 
whether producers are increasingly depending on 
the global market for their profit margins (Stopford 
and Strange 1991); furthemiore, the next question 
is whether these altered conditions affect the bar­
gaining relationship (in whatever institutional form) 
between governments and such businesses.
sion of where to locate the qualitative threshold, 
globalization is different, as argued above, because
V . 1 ' \s*
of the increased irrelevancy of national geography 
for economic relations; and, even though one can 
argue about which specific economic sectors in 
which nation-states are affected by globalization, 110 
sceptic scholar has yet argued that the changes in the 
world of international finance have not effectively
w
globalized financial relations.
Third, the point made by Anningeon about the 
role of nation-state is well-taken: the nation-state 
has often been considered a powerless victim of the 
dark forces of globalization. One eloquent example 
of this view is Ohmae’s (1995) prophecy of the rise 
of economically mutually dependent regions (such 
as the Medan-Penang-Phuket triangle) that are 
bound to carve their own autonomy out of the sov­
ereignty of their encompassing nation-states (in this 
example Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia). This 
view essentially ignores the role of politics in eco­
nomics and has been hampering the analysis of 
interdependence ever since the tenn was invented. 
Even in the fast world of international finance, 
where one trillion US dollars are changing location 
every day, the role of the nation-state is now being 
recognized. First of all, important steps towards the 
liberalization of international financial markets from 
the 1960s on were taken deliberately by nation­
states (the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Japan) in order to further their national interest 
(Helleiner 1994; Moran 1991). It is certainly feasible 
that nation-states attempt to snatch back from the 
international markets what they had given away 
previously. Although most scholars agree that uni­
lateral withdrawal from the global financial market 
is not a viable option, international policy coordina­
tion, such as in EMU, is considered a possible in­
strument to fight international finance (Dyson
1994).
However, this is not to say that the impact of glo­
bal international finance can be stopped at the bor­
ders. Indeed, even if one maintained severe doubts 
about the impact of economic globalization on the 
room for manoeuvre of nation-states, it would be 
dangerous to neglect the potential power of the
Second, it can still be argued that globalization is international financial markets. National govem- 
qualitatively different from interdependencies in ments that give the impression to start performing
the past. Although it could still be a matter of discus badly in teims of budget deficit, inflation, and pub-
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lie debt, will be liable to international financial spec­
ulation (cf. Millman 1995). Individual countries, 
such as Sweden in the Autumn of 1992, that defy 
speculation by rising marginal intervention rates to 
500%, are forced nevertheless to adapt eventually to
Fifth, analyses of the relationship between glo­
balization and national autonomy often present 
conclusions in either/or terms. Either the state re­
tains autonomy, or it does not. One is struck, how­
ever, by the differences various socio-economic
the grim reality of international financial interde- sectors experience in the impact of globalization, 
pendence: a reform packet was introduced and the Let us first have a look at the impact of financial glo- 
Swedish Krone had to abandon its pegging to the balization. It is supposed to benefit sophisticated fi-
ECU (Stern and Sundelius, forthcoming). It could 
be argued that the more governments have explicit-
nancial capital over small savers; securities firms over 
commercial banks; skilled white collar labour over
ly pronounced their commitment to neoliberal immobile labour in manufactures; footloose indus- 
economic policies, 01* to what has been dubbed tries over immobile domestic firms (Walter t 993 : p.
255- 6). The impact of economic globalization, 011 
the other hand, is supposed to have a different im­
pact on different sectors, depending on which fac­
tors of production are relevant to the sector in ques­
tion (Frieden and Rogowski 1996). The implica­
tion of these observations is that one should not start
the idea o f ‘sound money’ (Dyson 1994), the more 
vulnerable they are with regard to shifts in assess­
ments by, and perceptions of, international financial 
traders. It can therefore be expected that the more 
Western European governments have agreed to 
pursue the Maastricht criteria for monetary union, 
the more the specific policy choices that they make 
regarding their welfare states will be affected by the 
behaviour of international finance. It would be 
wrong to assume that once the budgetary room for 
manoeuver will have been established within the 
confines of the criteria for monetary union, a na­
tion-state can take any policy measure it likes: spe­
cific measures will be assessed by the international 
financial markets.
Fourth, Anningeon is right to stress the role of 
institutions that mediate between the influence of 
the international economy and governmental poli-
analyzing the impact of globalization at the national 
level, but rather at the meso level of socio-econom- 
ic sectors. Undoubtedly, the impact of institutional 
arrangements, at both the national and sectoral 
level, will still have to be taken into account. At the 
same time, one should be aware that adjustment 
policies, even though originally aimed at the main­
tenance of the Keynesian welfare state, can have the 
opposite effect of changing the institutional config­
uration itself that previously provided a bias of mo­
bilization in favour o f‘victims’ of globalization.
Finally, it should not be forgotten that stimuli
cies. In an excellent overview of the possible niedi- from the international environment provide new 
ating role of national institutions, Garrett and Lange opportunities for political actors to pursue the poli- 
argue that economic globalization will lead to an at- cies they always wanted to pursue. In that context
tack on the arrangements of the Keynesian welfare 
state only in those societies that can be characterized
Anningeon’s use of social security transfers at the 
national level to assess the increased or decreased 
as economically pluralist, that is, where interests af- autonomy of national governments may not be suf­
fered by globalization are directly and immediately ficient (Armingeon 1996). It will be important to 
represented, and translated into governmental poli- know the contents of certain policies; even though 
cies. However, no OECD country can at present the level of spending may not have changed signifi- 
be characterized as such. Garrett and Lange there- candy, the contents of the policies may, possibly as a 
fore claim that globalization will lead to rallying be- product of conflict generated by globalization (cf.
haviour to the defense of the Keynesian welfare 
state because institutions that mediate between 
groups affected and governments (such as labour
Van Kersbergen’s analysis of welfare state policies,
1995)*
In sum, the jury is still out: the impact offinancial
market institutions, electoral systems, the role of ve- and economic globalization on the national auton- 
to players, and the autonomy ofbureaucratic actors) omy of states is contingent upon a variety of (actors.
tend to favour those conservative forces (Garrett 
and Lange 1996),
One possibility is that states try to ‘pool’ their sove­
reignty and look to international institutions in or-
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der to cope with adjustment problems (Schmidt
1995)* This brings us to European integration and 
the emergent multi-tiered governance of the Euro­
pean Union as an additional level of governance in 
the context of which national policy-making takes 
place.
3.3 European integration and its political consequences — 
The process of European integration can partly be 
seen as a response to the increase in economic inter­
dependence since World War Two. The recent re­
launching of Europe, as shown in the Single Euro­
pean Act and the Treaty of Maastricht, is related to 
the globalization of the economy. In this perspec­
tive significant steps towards the coordination of 
policies within Europe are interpreted as deliberate 
attempts of national states to cope with the pressures 
of the international economy. Member states of the 
European Union have given up sovereignty only in 
those areas where they really could not pursue poli­
cies 011 their own, such as agriculture, steel, coal, et­
cetera. The creation of the internal market has pro­
vided them with the possibility of benefitting from 
enlarging their markets without becoming entirely 
subjected to world market fluctuations and uncer­
tainties. The pooling of sovereignty allows European 
states to open up partially to the world market while 
simultaneously avoiding the negative effects that 
they would have encountered had they decided in 
favour of completely opening up to the global mar­
ket individually (Keohane and Hoffrnann 1991 ; 
Milward 1992; Milward et al 1993).
European integration has in this sense allowed 
individual nation-states to maintain political inde­
pendence as well as a considerable control over the 
production of goods and services, which -  in turn 
and by implication -  facilitated the construction and 
maintenance of welfare state arrangements. The 
counterfactual reasoning is that if Europe had re­
mained a system of relatively closed economies, the 
national states would never have reached the level 
of welfare state development that they did. More­
over, had the national states opened up to the world 
market by themselves, the consequences of adjust­
ment in terms of social costs would have exceeded 
the capacity of the national welfare state. Underly­
ing this historical analysis we can find an axiom of 
political behaviour analogous to the one we ob­
served above: political elites want to survive in elec­
tions and therefore have to produce a certain level 
of wealth and welfare and particularly an acceptable 
degree of social security in an increasingly unpre­
dictable environment. Electoral pressure, like the 
pain of adjustment, is felt in the short am, while the 
fruits of adjustment can be reaped only in the long 
run. European integration can therefore historically 
be understood as the rescue of the European na­
tional welfare state (Milward 1992).
The contemporary challenge, of course, finds its 
origin in the fact that the European solution to glo­
balization is only temporary and confined to a 
unique historical era. Given the acceleration of glo­
balization since the 1980s, it is highly questionable 
whether the creation of an internal market and the 
European Union will suffice as means to avoid or at 
least pool the potentially negative consequences of 
world market integration. European industries still 
need to compete and now on a larger scale as they 
face rivals from the United States, Japan and the 
Asian Tigers, as well as from countries such as Brazil, 
India and Indonesia. What seems inevitable, how­
ever, is that both globalization and European inte­
gration challenge the national welfare states more 
intensely than before. Ironically, the preferred solu­
tion to problems posed by globalization, namely in­
creased European cooperation, produces similar 
dangerous effects on political parties and politicians.
Suppose we accept the idea that the process of 
European integration can indeed be interpreted as a 
historical attempt to rescue the nation-state. Ac­
cording to this view states give up pieces of their na­
tional sovereignty in order to keep some control 
over the production of the goods and services upon 
which their welfare states are built and upon which 
the political survival of political elites ultimately de­
pend. A corollary of this argument is that states have 
managed to preserve a relative sphere of autonomy 
and that the primary loyalty of their populations 
continued to be focused on the nation-state. The 
question, however, is whether this ‘salvation 
theory’, based on archival research covering the 
1950- 19Ó2 period, is still relevant today: recent de­
velopments suggest that the foundations of the na- 
tion-state are attacked by accelerating globalization and 
-  paradoxically -  by the intensification of European in­
tegration.
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If the effects of globalization of the economy can 
be limited by European integration only to a certain 
extent and during a limited amount of time, then 
nation-states have only -  although not insignifi­
cantly -  been postponing the decrease of .sovereign­
ty. They may now be entering a phase in which 
they will again lose control over their national 
economies. This may produce a reduction of the 
amount of authority a state holds over its citizens:
j
the less evident it is that a state is capable ol deliver­
ing the goods, the less authority it can claim. Most
national welfare state. With respect to the national 
aspect the issue of authority is crucial. The extent to 
which national states are able to maintain control 
over social policies (guaranteeing social rights in 
tenus of effectiveness as well as efficiency) deter­
mines the extent to which a national welfare state 
regime can be upheld. Some welfare state regimes, 
with their characteristic institutions and social and 
political coalitions, are more likely to withstand 
transnational threats than others. With regard to the 
transnational dimension it is crucial to understand to
states that participate in the global economy are what extent individual states are willing (and able)
losing authority, while their citizens are losing to transfer competencies to the European Union or
their long-standing identity with the nation-state are compelled to give up part of their s over eignty in
(Huntington 1993: p. 25- 29). Moreover, the loss of the realm of social policy. Moreover, the extent to
authority and national popular identification are ex- which the political idiosyncrasy of the European
pedited by the disappearance of the ideological Union in fact allo ws the development of a Europe-
threat of the communist world (Mine 1993: p. 10). an social policy that can substitute for the loss of na-
Even if European integration did prove to be the tional policies is a second major issue.
key to moderating the effects of globalization in the Among the many possible analytical angles from
past, European nation-states are now facing a situa- where the contemporary predicament of the wel­
don in which international policy coordination, fare state can be analyzed, we would like to stress 
whether of an intergovernmental or supranational three major political assumptions particularly rele- 
nature, no longer guarantees the full protection of vant in the present context. Firstly, we accept the 
the integrity of the nation-state. The adoption of thesis of welfare state regime theory that the institu- 
the Single European Act and the spillover effects it tional characteristics of welfare states are politically 
produced, resulting in the Treaty of Maastricht and determined and rest on historically specific social 
the Schengen-agreement, have created a multi- and political coalitions. Welfare states are the product 
layered European Union in which dozens of differ- of political struggles. Secondly, we believe that wel- 
ent policy subsystems exist for as many policy issues. fare states do many things, but ultimately are also in- 
This multi-layered political system hosts a number struments for generating political support. The fate of 
of actors, national, local, regional, functional, trans- those actors politically attached to a specific welfare 
national, etcetera, who seek authority' and demand state regime depends upon the extent to which 
goods from that system. Ultimately, it can be argued these actors manage to sustain the positive political 
that Bmssels is gaining authority simply because it is feedback mechanisms of the regime. In other
increasingly better able than nation-states to pro­
duce the goods that political actors want. The Eu­
ropean Union is gaining functional legitimacy.
words, those politically benefitting from the welfare 
state have an interest in maintaining its configura­
tion, although they may currently be incapable of
Pekka Kosonen (1994: p. I 5 2“ 3) ascertains that doing this with detrimental effects on their position 
‘national welfare states are weakening but new Eu- of power. The first and second thesis taken together
ropean institutions are not replacing them’, and that 
-  as a result -  ‘inequalities and social gaps are likely 
to widen again’. Analyzing the effects of European 
integration on the welfare state involves two di-
imply that welfare states are both the medium and 
outcome of political power and that the severing of 
the causal loop will affect both welfare state regimes 
and political actors. Thirdly, we appreciate polity-
mensions that are closely related but nevertheless centred theories to the extent that they emphasize
need to be distinguished analytically: the effect of that institutions, once established, develop a logic of
integration on national welfare states and the conse- their own that cannot be reduced to political or so-
quences of integration for a transnational or supra- rial actors and their interests. This implies that na-
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tional welfare state regimes tend to be institutionally 
resistant to change even if the founding political and 
social coalitions upon which the regime originally 
rested have been dramatically transformed. In his 
study of the contemporary politics of retrenchment, 
Pierson ( 1 996) finds a strinking stability of the wel­
fare state. The reasons for stability are predominant­
ly political, i.e. powerful political forces and vested 
interests, pardy generated by social policies and in­
stitutions themselves, ‘stabilize welfare states and 
channel change in the direction of incremental 
modifications of existing policies’ (Pierson 1996: p. 
174). Democratic political institutions are inherent­
ly conservative. The politics of retrenchment is 
electorally extremely risky. The core support for 
the welfare state is still largely in tact. Path depen­
dency explains institutional resistance and inertia. 
The central argument is that 'frontal assaults 011 the 
welfare state cany tremendous electoral risks. The 
contemporary politics of the welfare state is the pol­
itics of blame avoidance. Governments confronting 
the electoral imperatives of modem democracy will 
undertake retrenchment only when they discover 
ways to minimize the political costs involved’ (Pier­
son 1996: p. 178—79)* This implies that the observed 
commonality (‘Everywhere, retrenchment is a diffi­
cult undertaking. The welfare state remains the 
most resilient aspect of the postwar political 
economy’ [Pierson 1996: 179]) causes the continua­
tion of political, institutional and policy variation.
However, electoral risks and path dependency 
may make the politics of difficult, but certain pres­
sure, e.g., to cope with financial crises of social se­
curity fluids, may leave little choice. Postwar ad­
vanced capitalist democracies have generally been 
characterized by economic prosperity, stable po­
lities and relatively fixed political alignments, politi­
cally recognized systems of interest intermediation, 
the institutionalization of distinctive welfare state 
regimes, and international economic integration. 
The European nation-states have exhibited histori­
cally specific economic and political-institutional 
qualities that have governed distinctive paths of 
postwar economic growth and modernization, that 
have constrained the adaptation to the economic 
stagnation and the crises of the 1970s and 1980s in 
particular manners, and that are currently structur­
ing a characteristic response to the globalization of
the international economy, European integration 
and the transformation of capitalism into what we 
are still compelled to call post-industrial society.
At a general level, and in accordance to Pierson’s 
argument, the extent to which political actors have 
managed to uphold nationally specific welfare state 
regimes even under worsening economic condi­
tions and changing structural constraints hinged 
upon the political capacity to preserve and reinforce 
social and political coalitions and power resources 
that were capable of countering various forces of 
transfonnation, whether these arose from domestic 
social and political contexts or stemmed from trans­
national, systemic constraints. But it has precisely 
been the increasing difficulty of defending a distinc­
tive political heritage, which is seriously hampering 
the capacity of continued power mobilization for 
national political actors.
In spite of enonnous electoral risks, as politics 
and policies become increasingly contradictory vis- 
à-vis the requirements of world market integration, 
political actors may find themselves in precarious 
circumstances. Transnational pressures limit the 
room for upholding welfare state regimes as they 
historically evolved. National political actor's find it 
increasingly difficult to cope with these pressures. 
The inability to guarantee deeply-rooted and 
electorally popular welfare state arrangements in the 
context of globalization and European integration is 
likely to cause an unfavourable political backlash at 
the national level If it is the case that welfare states 
have been crucial national means to compensate for 
the social costs of participating in the international 
economy as well as instruments in the generation of  
political support, then the political actors politically 
most attached to a welfare state regime tend to be 
the first and foremost victims of the backlash. The 
general sources that used to provide national media 
of exchange are drying up under the impact of in­
creasing transnational economic and political pres­
sures and internal social and political changes. Wel­
fare states increasingly fail to deliver the goods and 
services that provided the currency for the kind of 
beneficial political exchanges that the political ac­
ton and vested interests have traditionally nurtured 
in the attempt to mediate opposed societal interests 
and generate political support within the confines of 
the nation-state. Whether politicians try to avoid
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retrenchment or not, they may find themselves 
confronted with dilemma and trade-offs. Which­
ever solution chosen, electoral punishment is a dis­
tinct possibility. In other words, avoiding blame 
may not be an option, because not following the 
path of retrenchment is equally risking. Perhaps the 
politics of avoiding blame is very limited.
Generally speaking, the weariness of many na­
tionally specific welfare state arrangements drains 
the power resources of actors politically affiliated 
with these systems. Controversies over the rising 
costs of the welfare state rapidly intensify and these 
tend to make favourable positive-sum exchanges 
between different social groups and interests politi­
cally much more demanding.
In spite of these developments and the political 
transfomiations they are currently provoking in na­
tional polities, social and economic policies still typ­
ically pursued nevertheless remain largely rooted 
institutionally in the dominant, postwar paradigm 
of welfare regimes. The new requirements of flex­
ible labour markets, the transfonnation of the com­
position of households and demographic changes, 
however, require fundamental, if not radical, eco­
nomic and social policy innovations. The existing 
institutional arrangements, in the context of which 
social and economic policies were formulated, can 
no longer remain grounded on the kind of arrange­
ments, that national political actors have traditionally 
nurtured.
The contemporary predicament of main politi­
cal parties (socialist, conservative, liberal or Christian 
democratic) is therefore also partly an effect of the 
incompatibility of the social and economic realities 
of the 1990S and the ill-adapted institutions of wel­
fare state regimes. National political actors appear to 
be in double trouble. On the one hand, their trou­
ble consists of the declining ideological and political 
significance of national cleavage structures (particu­
larly class and religion) which hampers traditional 
practices of mobilization and appeal. On the other 
hand, the politics of national accommodation to 
transnational requirements is losing its potential for 
success as the terms and goods upon which stable 
accommodations of conflicts of interests were based 
are increasingly becoming scarce and the conditions 
under which welfare state arrangements originally 
arose no longer obtain.
The potentially negative effect on the electoral 
position of national political parties, however, was 
initially mediated by the institutionalized social co­
alitions that political parties fostered since the 1950s 
and 19ÓOS and were able to maintain to a large ex­
tent in the 1970s and 1980s. On the basis o f such 
patterned coalitions and via their policy-oriented 
behaviour political parties attempted to shape a 
postwar configuration of the national political 
economy that had the capacity to maintain or even 
reinforce the social bases of power in spite of the de­
clining social and political impact of the traditional 
cleavage structure.
In the 1990s, however, this type of political mo­
bilization appears to have spent its strength. The di­
verging electoral performances of national political 
actors in the 1980s and 1990s were related to differ­
ences in the nature of alliances and welfare state ar­
rangements as well as to (pardy unpredictable) his­
torically unique developments, such as the end of 
the Cold War, the acceleration of globalization and 
the intensification of European integration. In those 
countries where political parties primarily integrat­
ed social coalitions via highly organized and regulat­
ed institutional practices of visible political protec­
tion and tangible exchange, their fate became much 
more directly linked with the state of the political 
economies and therefore with the level of integra­
tion in the world market. To put it as a simple hy­
pothesis: the worse a national political economy or 
welfare state regime fares in the con text of transna­
tional pressures, the more precarious the position of 
the political actors most attached to the regime be­
comes. In such countries electorates hold political 
actors instantly responsible for the failure o f the 
government dominated by the party to continue to 
guarantee the kind of social compensation that they 
had grown accustomed to. In nations, where social 
coalitions underlying a welfare regime traditionally 
relied much less on such visible and directly palpa­
ble social compensations, the political backlash has 
been less pronounced and the prospects for sus­
tained electoral competitiveness was accordingly 
much rosier.
We may-further hypothesize that social policy -  
for political parties in general and for social demo­
cratic and Christian democratic parties in particular— 
has remained a key to power mobilization, if only
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because of the electoral popularity of many social 
schemes. Such parties are therefore most reluctant 
to transfer national sovereignty to the arena of social 
policy in the European Union, since loss of control 
over this field involves a considerable electoral risk. 
In fact, political actors cling to social policy as an 
electoral asset. To the extent that social policy nec­
essarily acquires or already has a more European di­
guaranteed civil and political rights. Secondly, the 
potentially detrimental effects of legally regulated 
yet socially unconstrained markets require the es­
tablishment of a system of effective social rights and 
a European social citizenship (see Kleinman and Pi- 
achaud 1993: 15).
Markets have generally tended to produce social 
distress for which national welfare states have his—
mension, national political actors are likely to try to torically provided relief. The transnationalization of 
influence the direction of policies so as to satisfy markets, however, currently impedes these national 
their national interests, especially the interests of arrangements as a result of which the demand for a
Europeanization of social policy is reinforced. Spe-core electoral groups, or to adopt a more defensive 
strategy such as hiding the costs of a European poli­
cy, or shifting the blame for costly policies to -
cifically, economic integration has produced the 
critical risk o f‘social dumping’ (see Mosley 1990: p.
Brussels’. This implies that part of the national polit- 160; Erickson and Kuruvilla 1994), i.e. 4 (...) the pos-
ical struggle may be transferred to the European 
level, as a result of which the transnationalization of 
political parties and alliances becomes a crucial van»
sibility that firms operating where "social" wages are 
low may be able to undercut the prices of competi­
tors, forcing higher cost fmns to either go out of 
able for understanding European social policy de- business, relocate to low social wage areas or pres- 
velopments. However, social policy in Europe is sure their governments to reduce social wage costs’
(Leibfried and Pierson 1994: p. 38).
These and other unfavourable social conse­
quences of economic integration (e.g., ‘social
exceedingly fragmented to the extent that some 
policies remain national, some are transnational but 
not European (such as WTO provisions [see Gross- 
mann and Koopman 1994] and ILO conventions tourism’, mass migration, mass unemployment, 
[see Otting 1994]), while others are European, but poverty) necessitate more positive social interven- 
are governed by diverging voting procedures (see tion at the European level This is not only the case 
Addison and Siebert 1994: p. 20- 1). This poses the because the potentially harmful aftennath of eco-
question whether a truly European social policy, in- nomic unification is socially unacceptable, but also
stitutionalized in a European welfare state regime is because if social integration keeps lagging behind
at all possible. economic unification, the veiy political project of a
Two perspectives are strongly present in the European Union will be jeopardized.
growing literature on the Europeanization of the 
welfare state. The first is that mounting social and 
economic pressures are likely to encourage the Eu-
This view appears first and foremost to be 
grounded in the functionalist theory of moderniza­
tion shortly characterized above and therefore has
ropean Union to complement economic integra- the same weakness. It is an attempt to explain the
tion by expanding its social policy efforts. The sec- origin and development of European social policy
ond viewpoint holds that such social policy efforts at arrangements in terms of the functional response of
the level of the European Union are unlikely as they the state to societal needs. Such needs are argued to
are severely constrained by rigorous institutional, be increasing as a result of which the functional de­
political and regional obstacles. mands on the European state are escalating up to a
Analytically, the first position appeal's to antici- point where coordinated social intervention is in­
pate a shift from negative integration towards positive evitable. The general point is that a European wel- 
integration (see Leibfried 1993: p. 134- 5; Leibfried fare state is a function of economic integration in 
and Pierson 1994). Firstly, the (negative) levelling of the dual sense of being both an effect of and condu- 
barriers for the development of transnational capi- cive to the process of integration. A major problem 
talist markets for goods, capital, services and people of this view is that there is no such thing as a Euro- 
indispensably involves embedding these markets pean state that is comparable to the national state as 
positively in a legal framework characterized by we know it today. As a result, drawing a parallel
* »  ' < « * ■ *  v *
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between the process of nation-building in Europe 
and European integration is problematic.
The second perspective does not necessarily de­
ny the existence of social and economic pressures 
on social policy initiatives and the possibility o f‘spill 
overs’, but does reject the notion of an automatic 
and fonction al response of the European Union. 
Instead, this view stresses that the development of a 
European welfare state is institutionally, politically, 
and regionally constrained.
European voting rules in the arena of social poli­
cy function as institutional constraints on the ability 
to formulate and implement coherent social poli­
cies. The improbability of durable transnational 
political coalitions that may encourage the progress 
towards a European welfare state constitute an 
unfavourable political setting for social policy de­
velopment. Imbalances in economic and social 
development appear to rule out a common social 
policy because of the unbridgeable gap between the 
European regions and the immense if not insuper­
able levels of transfers and extent of redistribution a 
European social policy would involve. The ability 
to design social policies that are capable of matching 
popular expectations and vested interests in highly 
developed areas as well as raising the level of social 
security in a broad sense in Europe’s poorer regions 
is limited.
This view also assumes that the European Union 
can be considered as a national state in development 
and that the difficulty of designing a European social 
policy is an effect of still imperfect integration. In 
other words, the expectation is that once the coin­
cidence of a European economic, social and politi­
cal order is established and guaranteed, a normal 
development towards a European welfare state is 
possible. It would, however, be an error to consider 
the European Union comparable to the national 
state. How to get a clear picture of the nature of the 
European Union in which some policy areas are 
defined as supranational with an independent 
authority for the Commission, while other areas 
such as social policy are largely still the domain of 
national states and policies are mainly coordinated 
intergovemmentally. Perhaps it is more appropriate 
to characterize the European Union as a political 
system where a multitude of actors defend and 
promote their interests. Such a political system is
neither supranational nor intergovernmental. Many 
different types of issue areas exist, each with their 
own type ofpolitics: sometimes intergovernmental, 
sometimes supranational, sometimes the product of 
competition between lobby groups, sometimes the 
product of long standing relations between Direc­
torates in Brussels and interest groups which enjoy 
privileged access. Indeed, following Schattschnei- 
der’s dictum, one could say that within the Europe­
an Union each policy area has generated its own 
political game. This implies that many actors are 
seeking benefits and many actors are claiming 
authority over a variety of policy areas. Given the 
unlikelihood that nation-states at some moment are 
willing to give up their sovereignty completely, the 
most likely development of the European political 
system is one of organized anarchy in which knowl­
edge of the rules, both formal and informal, of the 
political game in each specific policy area will be the 
main currency.
Such a situation of organized anarchy has been 
labelled the new medievalism (see Mine 1993; Weh- 
ner 1992). It is a situation in which local, regional, 
national and supranational actors all compete for 
policymaking and citizens’ loyalty, and in which 
many actors — political and departmental actors, 
interest groups and private citizens — are simultane­
ously trying to increase the level of welfare for the 
individuals they are catering to. How to conceive of 
a European welfare state when the structure ofpoli­
tics is so fluid, authorities are challenged and contin­
uously competed for, and welfare sought after by so 
many different actors at so many different levels? 
This complex context of multiple European issue 
areas all of which can be relevant to social policies 
suggests that any analysis of European social policy 
should start from an institutionalist perspective.
Conclusion
European welfare states and their social policies are 
not likely to take a uniform shape because of the 
twin pressures of European integration and global­
ization; nor will a truly European welfare state be 
founded in the near future. The following argu­
ments account for this conclusion: first, social policy 
is still an important electoral tool to national politi­
cians; second, pressures from economic globaliza­
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tion are not directly and uniformly translated into 
the abandonment of welfare policies. Third, the in­
stitutional configuration of most OECD countries 
produces a bias in favour of such conservative inte­
rests. Two factors, however, may eventually invite 
national politicians to adopt a different attitude. In 
the first place, international financial markets may 
eventually force national governments to change 
their social policies substantially. As of now, adher­
ence to the Maastricht criteria of monetary union 
has been enforced to a considerable extent by the 
pressures from financial markets. Today, it seems 
that the markets are taking into consideration the 
level of spending on social security only. However, 
it remains to be seen how financial markets will re­
spond to the contents of specific social policies: Ital­
ian pension reforms were initially rejected by the 
markets. Now, it is true that the markets were judg­
ing the specific policy in the context of the question 
whether it would contribute to meeting the Maas­
tricht criteria. However, it may be an indicator that 
financial markets under an E.M.U. will be behaving 
on the basis of an assessment of specific policies rath­
er than total budgets and debts. In the second place, 
specific policy measures taken by national govern­
ments in social policy, although in the defense of 
the Keynesian welfare state, may alter the institu­
tional conditions underpinning it. Social security 
policies in Belgium and Germany have produced 
serious clashes between the regions and the federal 
state and the Länder and the Bundesregiemng, respec­
tively. The outcomes of such conflicts may alter sig­
nificantly the institutional context of social policy 
making. Some claim that that may lead to regional 
islands of claims for authority and policymaking 
(see, e.g., Mine 1993; Katzenstein 1996). In our 
view, this would add a complication to the multi­
tiered system of policymaking in Europe, in which 
ultimately there is one big prize to be won: the loy­
alty of citizens and, with it, the possession of politi­
cal power.
and labour markets’, Institut jlir Politische Wissenschaft, Heidel­
berg University, Germany, September 26-28, 1996.
Note
i . This article is based on a paper, entided ‘Common pres­
sures, different outcomes? Globalization, European integra­
tion and the institutional legacies of national welfare states1, 
prepared for the conference 011 ‘Globalisation, welfare states,
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Samenvatting
Het sociaal beleid van Europese verzorgingstaten staat onder 
druk van een groot aantal binnenlandse en transnationale ont­
wikkelingen. Economische mondialisering en recente ont­
wikkelingen in de Europese Unie staan in dit artikel centraal. 
De conclusie luidt dat het hoogst onverstandig is daaruit af te 
leiden dat de beleidsvrijheid van nationale staten voor een ei­
gen sociaal beleid gedoemd is te verdwijnen en daarmee tege­
lijkertijd plaats te maken voor Europees sociaal beleid en uit­
eindelijk een Europese verzorgingsstaat. Dit is het geval 0111 
drieërlei reden: ten eerste is sociaal beleid nog altijd een terrein 
waarop verkiezingen worden gewonnen o f verloren; ten 
tweede wordt de druk die de mondialisering van de econo-
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mie uitoefent op de beleidsvrijheid van nationale staten in 
verschillende landen op zodanig uiteenlopende wijze gekana­
liseerd dat geen sprake is van een uniforme afbraak van sociaal 
beleid; ten derde versterkt de institutionele inrichting van so­
ciaal beleid in de meeste westerse landen dc neiging bestaand 
sociaal beleid voort te zetten. Dit conservatisme kan wellicht 
in de toekomst onder druk komen te staan indien zal blijken
dat de transnationale kracht van de internationale financiële 
markten zich zal richten op specifieke maatregelen van sociaal 
beleid o f  dat nationale aanpassingmaatregelen het bestaande 
institutionele evenwicht tussen sociale partners fundaemen- 
teel zal verstoren. Zelfs dan echter ligt een Europese verzor­
gingsstaat niet in het verschiet vanwege het zogenoemde 
multitiered karakter van de Europese Unie.
